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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the development of the shadow banking sector in the US leading up to the global finan-
cial crisis of 2007-2008. Shadow banking, or nonbank financial intermediation, consists of credit interme-
diation that takes place outside of the traditional banking sector. This can include off-balance sheet op-
erations at banks and finance holding companies as well as operations at other nonbank financial companies. 
The paper reviews how shadow banking emerged as a result of regulatory arbitrage and the search for higher 
returns before considering how it contributed to the buildup of systemic risk leading up to the crisis. It specif-
ically inspects the role of money market funds (MMFs) in supporting shadow banking. Finally, it engages 
with the reforms that emerged in the US in the wake of the crisis, concluding that more regulation is not nec-
essarily the solution and advocating for a more holistic strategy geared towards oversight and supervision.
Shadow Banks, Money Market Funds, and Regulation: 




The term “shadow banking” emerged in the financial vernacular 
in the wake of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis due to the role 
nonbank financial institutions played in the credit boom leading up 
to the crisis. Despite its nefarious name, shadow banking rather 
benignly consists of forms of credit intermediation that take place 
outside of the traditional banking sector. It can support econom-
ic activity by providing a valuable alternative source of credit for 
many firms and households (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2012). By diversifying their clients’ financing options, shadow 
banking activities facilitate competition between credit providers, 
which can produce credit solutions better tailored to individual ac-
tors’ needs (Financial Stability Board, 2020). Like banks, shadow 
bank entities perform services that include maturity, credit, and li-
quidity transformations; but unlike banks, they do not receive ex-
plicit or direct access to central bank liquidity or public sector cred-
it guarantees—namely, traditional banks’ lender of last resort and 
their access to deposit insurance (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 2012).
Such drawbacks, while excluding shadow banks from the stringent 
capital and liquidity requirements traditional banks must meet—
thus creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage—create a large 
potential for the shadow banking system to accumulate risk and 
run into liquidity problems. Since shadow banking entities rely on 
short-term maturity transformation, as banks do, they can also ex-
perience “runs”, which are an inherent risk for any entity engaged 
in liquidity and maturity transformation. However, not only do 
shadow banks lack the liquidity and credit guarantees that banks 
receive in order to mitigate the risk of runs, but they also do not 
receive the same oversight and regulation that discourages banks 
from engaging in risky activities in the first place. Also like the 
banking system, a run can create contagion risk and support procy-
clicality in the system by providing plentiful credit in good times 
but a smaller supply in bad times when people need it the most 
(Financial Stability Board, 2017). 
This paper will focus on the development of the shadow banking 
activities in the US that contributed to buildup of systemic risk lead-
ing up to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), specifically examining 
the role of money market funds in supporting these operations. It 
will mostly refer to the narrower definition of nonbank financial in-
termediation (which we will call “shadow banking activities”) that 
emerged with the transformation of the US banking system from a 
credit-risk intensive process to a market-risk intensive, wholesale 
funded, and fee-based process (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2012). The change in the system gave rise to entities that benefited 
from regulatory arbitrage to create new means of credit provision-
ing in and around the traditional banking system. After reviewing 
the system that emerged in the runup to the crisis, the paper will 
examine the particular role of money market mutual funds (MMFs) 
in this system. Finally, it will engage with the US reforms that 
emerged in the wake of the crisis before evaluating their efficacy 
and identifying their drawbacks.  
SHADOW BANKING: WHAT IS IT AND WHY IS IT A PROB-
LEM?
The shadow banking system thrives off the extra returns offered by 
the lack of regulation in more opaque corners of the financial sec-
tor. Shadow banking activities conducted by both entities close to 
the banking system, like off-balance sheet operations at banks and 
finance holding companies, and those further removed, like hedge 
funds and finance companies or insurance companies and pension 
funds, can generate risk that might spillover into the regular bank-
ing system (Financial Stability Board, 2017). As a result, a wide 
variety of operations might qualify as shadow banking activities, 
including asset-backed commercial paper channels, structured in-
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vestment vehicles (SIVs), credit hedge funds, money market mu-
tual funds, securities lenders, limited-purpose finance companies 
(LPFCs) and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).
The New York Federal Reserve divides such operations into four cat-
egories, defining shadow banking as any form of credit intermedia-
tion that is implicitly enhanced by official guarantees (debt issued or 
guaranteed by government-sponsored entities, reliant on the taxpay-
er), indirectly enhanced by official guarantees (off-balance sheet ac-
tivities of depository institutions like credit card loan commitments 
and lines of credit to conduits), indirectly and implicitly enhanced 
by official guarantees (bank-affiliated hedge funds, money market 
mutual funds, securities lending activities of custodian banks), or 
unenhanced by official guarantees (securities lending activities of 
insurance companies, pension funds and certain asset managers 
that don’t have access to official liquidity channels) (Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, 2012). Looking at the system a different 
way, we can also divide shadow banking activities between those 
conducted by GSEs, like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; “internal” 
shadow banking operations that emerged among domestic US banks 
conducting off-balance sheet securitization and using asset-manage-
ment techniques that let financial holding company (FHC)-affiliated 
banks lend with less capital; “external” shadow banking operations 
that take advantage of funding and maturity transformation of struc-
tured credit assets from offshore financial centers and Europe, in 
addition to the US; and the “parallel” banking system that includes 
nonbank finance companies and asset-backed securities intermedi-
aries driven by specialization and comparative advantage over regu-
lar banks. After the GFC, the majority of shadow banking activities 
outside those performed by GSEs exist in the parallel sub-system, 
since many of the “internal” and “external” sub-systems relied on 
pre-GFC economic and regulatory conditions (Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, 2012). This paper will focus on those internal 
shadow banking activities that amplified the crisis in the US, as well 
as the means of facilitating shadow banking across all four types, 
and the reforms enacted in the wake of the GFC to mitigate the ac-
cumulation of risk in such activities.
THE BUILDUP OF RISK
The internal shadow banking system emerged as a result of reg-
ulatory arbitrage in the 30 years preceding the GFC. Before this 
shift, banks operated as low return-on-equity (RoE) entities that 
originated, held, and funded loans through the use of deposits until 
they reached maturity. With the transformation, the FHC-affiliated 
banks could become high RoE entities by originating, warehous-
ing, and securitizing loans that they then distributed to other en-
tities or retained in their own off-balance sheet asset management 
vehicles (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2012). Of course, 
such off-balance sheet liabilities did not factor into these banks’ cal-
culations of capital requirements or liquidity requirements, at least 
not before the GFC. As a result, through off-balance sheet secu-
ritization and asset management techniques, FHC-affiliated banks 
could lend with less capital than would have been required had they 
kept the loans on their balance sheets, thus carving out a higher 
RoE. More specifically, the bank subsidiary, underneath the FHC, 
would originate the loan, warehouse and accumulate these off-bal-
ance sheet loans in a conduit managed by a broker-dealer subsid-
iary. These loans rely on wholesale funding markets like money 
market funds (MMFs)—importantly, a less liquid form of funding 
that is supposedly enhanced by the liquidity of the bank behind the 
operation. The broker-dealer subsidiary then securitizes the loans 
and transfers them into a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which is 
the off-balance structure of the loan. Finally, the safest tranches of 
structured credit assets receive funding in another off-balance sheet 
asset-backed securities intermediary, such as a structured invest-
ment vehicle (SIV) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2012).
Whereas a traditional bank originates, funds, and manages the risks 
of its loans all on its own balance sheet, shadow banking activities 
evidently involve increasingly complex credit intermediation chan-
nels. In addition to the bank subsidiary, many loans and mortgages 
in the US would pass through a network of broker-dealers, asset 
managers, and other vehicles, all under the FHC umbrella. And in-
stead of receiving funding through deposits, they would rely on 
other short-term funding options like MMFs and commercial paper 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2012). Increasingly opaque 
credit channels make it more difficult for liquidity to find its way 
through the system when it comes under stress. In other words, the 
bank subsidiary is the only actor with access to deposit insurance 
and liquidity channels through the Federal Reserve discount win-
dow, but the other entities involved in the loan process take just as 
large risks without as direct of a backstop, since they do not have 
easy access to these services. Plus, due to the interconnectedness of 
the system, the risk incurred by shadow banking activities in turn 
amplifies risk throughout the entire system and creates more oppor-
tunities for contagion (Financial Stability Board, 2017).
A CLOSER LOOK AT MMFS
Short-term funding, namely that offered by MMFs, played a large 
role in building up off-balance sheet risk and accelerating the fi-
nancial crisis in September of 2008. Generally considered of high 
credit quality, MMFs invest in instruments like commercial pa-
per, repurchase agreements, and US Treasuries (Gelzinis, 2019). 
However, even though MMFs invest in these short-term debt in-
struments (making them more susceptible to roll-over risk) MMF 
shares are redeemable on demand. Since they intend to maintain a 
stable net asset value (NAV), MMFs can give investors the impres-
sion of the same safety as holding demand deposits—but the fed-
eral government does not guarantee MMFs with deposit insurance 
(Financial Stability Board, 2017). In other words, MMF investors 
can redeem their shares on demand by selling them back to the 
fund, but without a government guarantee behind their “deposit”. 
By calling their shares, investors redeem at per share NAV, which 
reflects the value of the fund’s assets minus its liabilities. Because 
MMFs usually managed to maintain a stable NAV of $1 per share 
“The shadow banking system thrives off 
the extra returns offered by the lack of 
regulation in more opaque corners of 
the financial sector.”
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before the GFC, investors felt they could treat MMFs as a safe al-
ternative to bank deposits. MMFs let them diversify their holdings. 
If the NAV falls below $1, the MMF is said to “break the buck,” 
which can cause panic among investors. They worry the fund could 
suffer further losses, so a run-like scenario ensues where investors 
hurry to withdraw their shares, only increasing the likelihood the 
fund suffers further losses (Congressional Research Service, 2020).
Given the instrumental role MMFs played in funding the intercon-
nected shadow banking activities examined above, the Lehman 
Brothers Holding Inc.’s filing for bankruptcy on September 15, 
2008 caused major problems for the MMF that held Lehman-issued 
debt. The next day, the prominent Reserve Primary Fund had no 
choice but to write off its Lehman debt, causing its per share NAV 
to drop from $1 to $0.97. In other words, the fund broke the buck, 
triggering a run in money markets as investors worried that oth-
er MMFs would break the buck as well (Congressional Research 
Service, 2020). Note that the run is what deposit insurance in the 
normal banking system should prevent from occurring by dissuad-
ing depositors of the need to withdraw all of their money for fear 
the bank would become insolvent, when it is really just illiquid. 
Traditional banks’ capital and liquidity buffers also guard against 
this. Since preventing the run greatly lowers the probability that the 
bank becomes insolvent in the first place, such preventative mea-
sures are top priority for bank regulators—but the MMFs aren’t 
regulated like banks. Within a week of the Lehman bankruptcy, in-
vestors redeemed about $300 billion from various MMFs—taking 
14% out of the industry. At the Reserve Primary Fund alone, a $62 
billion money market fund, investors called about $40 billion in 
just two days. Holding about 40% of outstanding commercial paper 
in 2008, the MMF retreat caused companies that issued short-term 
debt to be shut out of credit markets. MMFs’ role in city and mu-
nicipal short-term debt markets caused a similar problem as these 
entities also had to find other sources of short-term funding (Per-
spectives on Money, 2012). Finally, the money market run put pres-
sure on broker-dealers, who were conducting highly interconnect-
ed credit intermediation between many market participants, since 
they relied on short-term funding solutions like MMFs (Financial 
Stability Board, 2017). In this way, the run in money markets am-
plified the credit crunch occurring throughout the financial system 
at the beginning of the crisis, reflecting the pitfalls of MMFs’ lack 
of government backstops that might have discouraged a run in the 
first place. 
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AND SUBSEQUENT REFORMS 
In an attempt to slow down the redemptions and ease short-term 
funding markets, in September 2008 the Treasury Department ex-
plicitly guaranteed the $1.00 share price for more than $3 trillion 
worth of MMF shares (Perspectives on Money, 2012). However, 
the crisis made it clear that the MMF industry needed reform to 
discourage such large redemptions from occurring in the future. 
In 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopt-
ed initial measures meant to reduce the risks of MMF portfolios. 
The Commission reduced maturity periods, raised credit stan-
dards, and put liquidity requirements in place to fortify MMFs’ 
abilities to meet redemptions. It also mandated the MMFs report 
more information about their portfolio to the public. According 
to SEC chairman Mary L. Schapiro’s 2012 testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the 
reforms supposedly helped the MMFs handle a three week period 
in June 2011 in which investors called in about $100 billion worth 
of shares; nevertheless, she points out that these redemptions oc-
curred over a longer period, were of a smaller magnitude, and did 
not occur in tandem with losses in fund portfolios (Perspectives on 
Money, 2012). In other words, the 2011 episode did not prove the 
efficacy of the initial reforms. It is also worth noting that the reform 
did not require funds to comply with the new expectation to be able 
to process transactions at prices other than the stable NAV until 
October 31, 2011 (Money Market Fund Reform). We might see this 
rule change reflected in Figure 1, which shows a large drop in the 
total value of US MMFs once they began conducting transactions 
below the stable NAV shortly before 2012. This might be the result 
of lower NAVs or less MMF activity overall. 
In 2014, additional reforms to NAV pricing helped to address some 
remaining weaknesses. This generation of regulation relies on the 
division of MMFs into three categories: municipal, which are tax-ex-
empt and invest in national or state municipal securities; government, 
which are the most creditworthy and invest in securities backed by 
the US government; and prime, which are investments into corpo-
rate debt, certificates of deposits, repurchase agreements, and other 
corporate instruments. MMFs can also be divided between retail, 
which means they are held by individual investors, and institution-
al, which means they are held by organizations. After further review 
in July 2014, the SEC required all institutional prime and institu-
tional municipal MMFs to float their NAV, as opposed to keeping a 
stable value, in order to more accurately reflect the market value of 
the fund (Congressional Research Service, 2020). In other words, 
MMFs began to buy and sell their shares using the market value of 
the fund’s assets, theoretically making investors more accustomed 
to changes in share prices and less likely to call in their shares all at 
once (Perspectives on Money, 2012). Government and retail MMFs 
could still use a stable NAV (Congressional Research Service, 2020), 
and the SEC saved the final compliance date for funds to reclassify 
as prime or government and for prime funds to float their NAVs un-
til October 14, 2016 (2014 Money Market Fund Reform Frequently 
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Figure 1. Total Absolute Market Value of All Holdings of US Money Mar-
ket Funds (2011-2021). Note. Original figure; data compiled in the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve’s historical data on Money Market 
Funds: Investment Holdings Detail
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Asked Questions). Likely as a result, in the period between passing 
the regulation in 2014 and the new distinctions between government 
and prime coming into effect in 2016, we see a shift in the share that 
government vs prime funds make up in the market. The greater share 
of prime funds suggests a greater share of MMFs investing in riskier 
securities like corporate debt rather than “safer” government securi-
ties. However, the addition of prime funds’ floating NAV might also 
have caused a distortion in the value of prime vs government funds. 
Finally, some of the shift from government to prime might also be 
the result of some MMFs reclassifying from government to prime.
The SEC also allowed MMF boards to impose redemption fees 
up to 2% and redemption gates up to ten days for all non-govern-
ment MMFs in order to discourage the magnitude and frequency 
of redemptions, which should help guard against a run. Finally, the 
SEC reform created macroprudential stress testing requirements for 
MMFs. These require the funds stress test their ability to maintain 
10% weekly liquid assets and minimize the volatility of their prin-
cipal in the face of hypothetical stress scenarios presented by the 
SEC. MMFs must demonstrate they can withstand challenges like 
short-term interest rates rising, certain portfolio security positions 
downgrading or going into default, and widening spreads in a num-
ber of different sectors (Congressional Research Service, 2020).
When it comes to evaluating the new regulation, the Financial Sta-
bility Board (FSB) asserts in its 2017 shadow banking assessment 
that these reforms have helped to lower the vulnerabilities of MMFs 
and repurchase agreements (Financial Stability Board, 2017). For 
instance, Figure 3 shows a decrease in the maturity of US MMFs 
since the early 2010s. This would increase their resilience to li-
quidity risks since a shorter maturity makes these short-term instru-
ments easier to call in. We see a runup in days until maturity before 
the 2016 compliance deadline, but otherwise maturity length shows 
a downward trend with cyclicality we might attribute to the busi-
ness cycle. This decline has helped contribute to the overall decline 
in shadow banking activities that contributed to the GFC (Financial 
Stability Board, 2017).
Additional measures to address the shadow banking sector in the US, 
which go beyond the scope of this MMF-focused paper, include the 
establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, specifi-
cally tasked to identify and address financial stability threats, in part 
through its authority to designate a nonbank financial firm as a sys-
temically important financial institution (SIFI) subject to enhanced 
supervisory and regulatory standards (Gelzinis, 2019). Nevertheless, 
after an initial drop in the wake of the GFC, MMFs across what the 
FSB terms the 21+ Euro area Group have grown even larger than 
their peak in the runup to the crisis (see Figure 4). In fact, collective 
investment vehicles subject to runs, including credit hedge funds, 
real estate funds, as well as MMFs, have also grown since the GFC. 
Finance companies and broker-dealers, who make use of short-term 
debt instruments like MMFs, have also maintained their high lever-
age, continued to engage in some maturity transformations, and 
grown in terms of market size (see Figures 5 and 6) (Financial Stabil-
ity Board, 2017). On one hand, these trends suggest that the types of 
shadow banking activities that contributed to the GFC are still major 
players in today’s financial system, potentially paving the way for fu-
ture liquidity crunches. On the other hand, the financial system might 
prefer that shadow banking activity remain in these “known” and 
now lightly regulated entities, rather than finding new, “unknown” 
credit intermediaries that regulators do not know to watch for.
YURJ | Vol 2.1 Spring 20214
Figure 2. Total Absolute Market Value of All Holdings of US Money Mar-
ket Funds (Prime, Municipal, and Government, 2011-2021). Note. Original 
figure; data compiled in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve’s 
historical data on Money Market Funds: Investment Holdings Detail 
Figure 3. Days until Maturity, US Money Market Funds (2011-2021). Note. 
Original figure; data compiled in the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve’s historical data on Money Market Funds: Investment Holdings Detail 
Figure 4. Money Market Funds in the 21+ Euro Group (2002-2018). Note. 
Original figure; data compiled in 2019 FSB Global Monitoring Report on 
Non-Bank Financial Intermediation
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CONCLUSION: UNFINISHED BUSINESS?
By definition, shadow banking activities emerge in those portions 
of the financial sector that can escape direct supervision and pru-
dential standards put in place by regulatory authorities. As a result, 
bank-like capital and liquidity requirements imposed on one type 
of credit intermediary should, by the logic of arbitrage, shift market 
activity to parts of the financial sector are not required to bear as 
high costs in order to hold reserves. The large size of “other” shad-
ow banking activities that the FSB has not identified hints at the 
potential for market activity to shift to such unknown entities if the 
known entities come under tighter regulation (see Figure 7). Com-
pared to the total assets of all commercial banks in the US, which 
follows a steadier growth pattern over the last 20 years (see Figure 
8), the dramatic increase in the size of the shadow banking sector 
of the 21+ Euro Group suggests that traditional understandings of 
nonbank financial services are failing to capture innovation in the 
shadow banking sector. In other words, it is not a coincidence that 
innovations are occurring on the frontiers of regulatory reach and 
are attracting more capital if they are able to deliver higher yields 
(at least in good times). The same logic explains how the shifting 
of loans to off-balance sheet asset management vehicles, which in 
part relied on short-term funding provided by MMFs, helped turn 
FHCs into high RoE entities by allowing them to avoid such regula-
tory requirements. However, in addition to the obvious proposition 
that more regulation drives activity (particular innovation like that 
likely captured by Figure 7) to less-regulated areas of the banking 
sector, regulation also drives activity into less supervised areas of 
the banking sector. In other words, in spite of the continued growth 
of shadow banking activities, more regulation is not necessarily the 
answer, especially if it drives activity from “known” entities—like 
FHCs’ off-balance sheet activities that supervisors know to keep an 
eye on—to “unknown” entities like those in Figure 7 that are harder 
for supervisors to observe.
Regarding the specific case of MMFs, regulatory authorities 
might still consider additional measures. While the FSOC des-
ignation authority should enhance regulatory standards imposed 
on the largest and most systemically important shadow banks that 
might rely on money markets, their weakened authority under the 
Trump administration casts doubts on their ability to effectively 
designate and supervise these interconnected entities. Addition-
al regulatory options include subjecting prime MMFs to capital 
buffer requirements that would theoretically guard against large-
scale defaults. However, an ability to absorb large defaults would 
require such a large and costly buffer that returns on MMFs would 
become comparable to default free securities (Lewis, 2015). Not 
only would such regulation defeat the whole reason behind hold-
ing MMFs, but it would also likely shift investors to other, unreg-
ulated types of credit intermediaries. 
Given the large size of shadow banking activities that already fall 
into the “other” category, a more holistic strategy geared towards 
oversight and supervision, rather than merely regulation, might be 
more suited to shadow banking. This would involve supervisors 
regularly assessing a variety of metrics, including the maturity of 
these various instruments, which gives information about liquid-
ity risks, and, in the context of MMFs, the relative sizes of prime 
(which are riskier) vs government (safer) MMF markets. Since 
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Figure 5. Finance Companies in the 21+ Euro Group (2002-2018). Note. 
Original figure; data compiled in 2019 FSB Global Monitoring Report on 
Non-Bank Financial Intermediation
Figure 6. Broker-Dealers in the 21+ Euro Group (2002-2018). Note. 
Original figure; data compiled in 2019 FSB Global Monitoring Report on 
Non-Bank Financial Intermediation
Figure 7. Other (Unidentified) Shadow Banking Activities in the 21+ Euro 
Group (2002-2018). Note. Original figure; data compiled in 2019 FSB 
Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation
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gauging risk in a market is so difficult, it is better that supervisors 
have the data to assess known entities rather than push innovating 
entities out of their vision with too much regulation. Less regula-
tion would not push these innovators out, and rather leave them in 
plain sight of the supervisor. A process of monitoring and subse-
quently regulating only the largest and most systemically import-
ant entities theoretically guards against the dangers of contagion 
spreading to unprepared, highly interconnected actors. Restraint 
towards smaller shadow banking activities still preserves the 
higher returns that keeps them in the shadows, without running 
as great a risk of pushing activity into unknown territory—it is a 
matter of choosing the known shadows over the unknown shad-
ows, so long as the known shadows are easier to monitor.
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